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PATENTING DILEMMA: DRUGS FOR PROFIT VERSUS
DRUGS FOR HEALTH
Christopher K. Eppich*
I. INTRODUCTION
The use of anthrax by bioterrorists in attacks against the United
States beginning in 2001 has resulted in a high demand for the leading
antibiotic ciprofloxacin (Cipro).' The production of Cipro is limited to
the manufacturing capabilities of the Bayer Corporation, its patent
owner, until December 2003.2 The capacity of this single company
cannot meet the increased production demands for Cipro, 3 and thus
shortages have resulted.4 Consequently, one 500 mg tablet of this
patented antibiotic may cost as much as $4.67 to wholesale pharmacies,
with even higher costs to patients. In response to this short supply and
high cost, United States Health and Human Services Secretary Tommy
G. Thompson has threatened to override Bayer's patent rights to Cipro
unless the company reduces prices and increases supply.
6
* Technical Editor, Santa Clara Law Review, Volume 43. J.D. candidate, Santa
Clara University School of Law; B.S., Brigham Young University.
1. See James Love, Talking Points on Cipro Patent Dispute (Oct. 24, 2001), available
at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/cl/cipro/talkingpoints.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2002)
[hereinafter Love, Talking Points]. Department of Health and Human Services Secretary
Tommy Thompson stated, we need medication for 10 million persons at a recommended
treatment of 120 tablets, or a total of 1.2 billion tablets. Bayer can produce two million
tablets per day requiring 600 days to supply the order. See id.
2. See Al Engelberg's Memo to Senator Schumer Regarding Ciproflaxin (Oct. 13,
2001) (letter from Alfred B. Engelberg to Senator Schumer entitled Increasing Access to
Cipro: A Strategy for Rapid Creation of a Government Stockpile), available at
http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/ip-health/2001-October/002105.html (last visited Jan. 15,
2002) [hereinafter Engleberg Letter].
3. See id
4. See id.
5. See Consumer Project on Technology, Selected Prices for Ciproflaxin (Oct. 25,
2001) (compilation of prices of Cipro for varying nations), available at
www.cptech.org/ip/health/cl/cipro/ciproprices.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2002) [hereinafter
Cipro Prices]. The price of one 500 mg tablet of Cipro available from Bayer ranges from
$1.83 to $4.67 to the U.S. government and the U.S. wholesale drug industry respectively.
See id
6. See Denise Gellene, Anthrax Cases Reshape Drug Price Debate, L.A. TIMES, Nov.
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This acute situation in the United States has renewed global
attention on patent rights that legally create prescription drug
monopolies. In and of itself, the invention and production of drugs
used to treat disease creates a dilemma. On one hand, the profit
opportunities motivate companies to extensively research and develop
critical new pharmaceuticals. On the other hand, the public needs
access to affordable medication in times of crisis.7 Although patent
protection is a necessary incentive to drive expensive research and
development, health emergencies beyond the short-term need for Cipro
in the United States, such as the spread of HIV in poor, developing
8
nations, require a reopening of this debate. The controversy rests
largely upon the use of compulsory licensing 9 as a means of lowering
pharmaceutical prices by removing patent rights and increasing drug
availability in poor countries.' 0 The World Trade Organization (WTO)
met recently to solve the problem of making effective use of
compulsory licensing under the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement, but could not find a solution."
This comment examines the issues created by compulsory
licensing and proposes a method to ensure successful use of
compulsory licensing in developing countries. Part II offers an
overview of the current health crisis 12 and reviews the provisions of the
TRIPS Agreement related to compulsory licensing and patent law. 3
Part II also reviews attempts by the United States to regulate
pharmaceutical patents abroad and the United States' emerging
9, 2001, at Business 1. In response to these U.S. threats, Bayer agreed to lower its price of
Cipro to the U.S. government to $0.95 per tablet and to supply the necessary medication for
I0 million persons. See id.
7. See id
8. See generally Amir Attaran & Lee Gillespie, Do Patents for Antiretroviral Drugs
Constrain Access to AIDS Treatment in Africa?, 286 JAMA 1886 (2001).
9. Compulsory licensing is the practice of issuing licenses to a country or third party
of a government granted patent without the prior agreement of the rightful patent owner.
Compulsory licenses are generally issued in times of public non-commercial use and in
times of national emergency. See infra Part II.B.2.
10. See John A. Harrelson, TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, and the HIV/AIDS Crisis:
Finding the Proper Balance Between Intellectual Property Rights and Compassion, 7
WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 175 (2001).
11. See Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health. (Nov. 14,
200 l)(declaration from the Doha WTO Ministerial 2001), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/ministe/min0Ie/mindecltrips-e.htm (last visited
Aug. 14, 2002) [hereinafter Doha]. The Conference further called for a "solution to th[e]
problem" of "making effective use of compulsory licensing" in WTO member countries
with "insufficient or no manufacturing capabilities." Id. para. 6.
12. See infra Part II.A.
13. See infra Part II.B.
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acceptance of compulsory licensing.1 4 Part III reviews the recent Doha
WTO Ministerial Conference and identifies the problems facing
developing nations in the current inoperable system of international
sales of patented pharmaceuticals.' 5 Part IV examines the dilemma and
discusses three possible methods of assisting developing nations in
gaining access to life-saving drugs while paying adequate
compensation to drug companies.' 6 Part V proposes a solution calling
for cooperation between developed nations, pharmaceutical companies,
and developing nations to allow swift access to needed drugs
worldwide.'
7
II. BACKGROUND
A. An Overview of the Situation
The United States has long advocated for pharmaceutical patent
protection in international trade negotiations. 8 Even when developing
nations resort to using compulsory licensing to force companies into
cheaper agreements during times of medical crisis, the United States
government uses threats of trade sanctions to pressure these nations
into backing away from compulsory licensing. 9 However, even the
United States itself has experienced the tug-of-war between protecting
patent rights and ensuring public health, as exhibited by its threat to
break patent protection to increase the supply of antibiotics following
imminent danger from anthrax outbreaks in 2001 and 2002.20
1. Developing Economies: The AIDS Threat
The AIDS epidemic is one of the most challenging public health
problems globally. 2' More than forty million people worldwide are
14. See infra Parts II.C-D.
15. See infra Part lI1.
16. See infra Parts IV.A-C.
17. See infra Part V.
18. See Reginald Dale, Striking a Balance on Patent Rights, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Oct.
30, 2001, at Finance 11 ("For years now, Washington has been the strongest defender of the
patent rights of multinational companies, as developing countries have increasingly
challenged them - most recently to procure cheaper medicines to combat AIDS.").
19. See Rosalyn S. Park, The International Drug Industry: What the Future Holds for
South Africa's HIV/AIDS Patients, 11 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 125, 137 (2002).
20. See Dale, supra note 18 ("The United States - and Canada - started acting like
developing nations.").
21. Bess-Carolina Dolmo, Examining Global Access to Essential Pharmaceuticals in
the Face of Patent Protection Rights: The South African Example, 7 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 137 (2001).
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infected with the AIDS virus,2 2 with the majority of those infected
living in developing nations such as sub-Saharan Africa, South and
Southeast Asia, and Latin America. 23 Sub-Saharan Africa is the most
heavily impacted region, with 28.1 million people living with HIV and
3.4 million new infections occurring in 2001.24
The problem is staggering. In 2001, five million people
contracted HIV worldwide, and three million died from AIDS. 25 Sub-
Saharan Africa alone accounted for 68% of the five million new
infections,26 and reported an estimated 2.3 million deaths related to
AIDS in 2001.27 Presently, at least 8.4% of adults in sub-Saharan
Africa are infected.28  The morbidity rate continues to cripple
developing nations and poses a real threat to the development of each
nation's government, economy, and health care system. 9
Newly patented antiretroviral therapies30 have been shown to
prolong life and reduce opportunistic infections, and may reduce HIV
to a chronic infection. 3' Although these drugs present the possibility of
lengthening the life span for millions of people, 32 high costs lower the
availability in developing nations.33 Patents on these medications drive
up costs, making access difficult for the general public until generics
22. See JOINT UNITED NATIONS PROGRAMME ON HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) & WORLD
HEALTH ORG. (WHO), AIDS EPIDEMIC UPDATE 5 (2001), available at
http://www.unaids.org/worldaidsday/2001/Epiupdate2001/
Epiupdate2001 en.pdf (last visited Jan. 17, 2002) [hereinafter UNAIDS].
23. See id. at 7.
24. See id.
25. See id. at 5.
26. See id. at 7.
27. See id. at 20.
28. See UNAIDS, supra note 22, at 7.
29. See id at 22.
30. Antiretroviral therapy is treatment concentrated on suppressing a retrovirus such as
HIV. Retroviruses contain an enzyme called reverse transcriptase that transcribes the
retrovirus' RNA into DNA. This new DNA integrates into the DNA of the host cell,
expressing the virus.
31. See WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, ANTIRETROVIRAL TREATMENTS FOR
HIV/AIDS (1997), available at http://www.who.int/inf-fs/en/factl63.htm (last visited Jan.
17, 2002).
32. See Park, supra note 19, at 127-28. These treatments include a combination of the
use of three types of drugs: antiretrovirals (ARVs) which act to decrease harm to the
immune system and to prevent in vivo transmission, anti-infectives which act to prevent
opportunistic infections, and pallative drugs which act to ease pain and suffering. See id.
33. Rachel Swarns, AIDS Obstacles Overwhelm a Small South African Town, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 29, 2001, at Al. ARVs costs an average of $12,000 in the United States. The
average income of a person in the sub-Sahara is around $500. Thus, even if pharmaceutical
reduced the costs substantially, medical treatment is unaffordable for many sub-Saharan
HIV/AIDS victims. See id
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can be manufactured at the expiration of the patent term.34 Until that
time, each poor nation faces the problem of medication in scant supply
at high prices."
2. Developed Nations: The Anthrax Threat
Developed nations encounter similar threats and arguments over
patent rights and drug costs during a time when demand for medication
is critical.36 For example, on September 11, 2001, the possibility of
bioterriorist attacks and the outbreak of an anthrax epidemic in the
United States became a reality.37 The United States Congress' Office
of Technology Assessment projects that just 100 kg of the deadly
spores could infect up to three million people with anthrax.38 The
Federation of American Scientists considers a "lethal dose of anthrax to
be 10,000 spores," calculating that "80 percent of a population that
inhaled such a dose would die.",39 Furthermore, "one millionth of a
gram is invariably fatal within five days to a [sic] week after
exposure.4 Such an attack can easily be calculated to bear
devastating results on any nation without the availability of an
antibiotic.41 However, with the use of an antibiotic, "the mortality rate
[for cutaneous anthrax infection] falls to less than one percent. ' 2
The antibiotic of choice for the treatment of anthrax is the Bayer
Corporation's Cipro, after it became the only approved oral treatment
of inhalation anthrax by the Food and Drug Administration and Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention.43 Following the September 11
terrorist attack and the ensuing anthrax scares, Americans besieged
34. See Park, supra note 19, at 131 ("Unfortunately, the implications of patent
protection mean developing countries will experience significantly higher drug prices.").
See also infra Part II.B. 1.
35. See Park, supra note 19, at 129.
36. Cf Gellene, supra note 6 ("Now bioterrorism has given new meaning to what
might be considered a health emergency.").
37. See Sharman Kobayashi, Bayer-CIPRO: A Case For Overriding Patent Owner
Rights?, PATENT CAFE (Oct. 31, 2001), available at
http://www.patentcafe.com/ipfrontline/05-4 1html (last visited Jan 18, 2002).
38. See The Federation of American Scientists, Biological Warfare Agents, available at
http://www.fas.org/nuke/intro/bw/agent.htm#b02 (last visited Jan. 17, 2002).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See id.
42. Id.
43. See generally Bayer Corporation, Infection Disease Specialist Dr. Paul lannini
Comments on Important Considerations for Taking Antibiotics for the Treatment of Anthrax
(Nov. 2, 2001), available at http://www.ciprousa.com/news/pressreleases-specialist.asp
(last visited Jan. 17, 2002).
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pharmacies in demand of Cipro. 4 This led to massive shortages of the
drug.45 In addition, United States Health and Human Services
Secretary Tommy G. Thompson ordered an emergency government
stockpile sufficient to treat ten million Americans.46 This order alone
requires 1.2 billion tablets, as the recommended dosage per person is
120 tablets.47 Bayer can manufacture just two million tablets per day,
and thus a lag time of almost two years is required to fill the order.48
Its patent protects Bayer as the sole producer of the drug,49 and thus
limits the supply of Cipro until at least December 2003. 50 The United
States consequently faces a situation similar to that of developing
nations in the sub-Sahara: medication has been created but is
unavailable to those in need.5'
3. Prices and Patent Protection
The cost of the antibiotics necessary to fight anthrax and other
such potentially devastating diseases varies from nation to nation. For
example, a 500 mg tablet of Cipro available in the United States costs
$4.67, while the same pill in New Zealand costs $1.29, and $2.10 in
South Africa. 52 This disparity in price is caused in large part by the
market control of pharmaceutical monopolies based on patent rights in
each country.
53
Patents operate to promote development of new products and
processes in the market.54 A pharmaceutical patent works to recoup
expensive research and development costs in the financially demanding
drug development industry.5 5 A patent grants the owner a right to
exclude others from practicing the technology the owner has
44. See Engelberg Letter, supra note 2.
45. See id.
46. See Love, Talking Points, supra note 1.
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See Engelberg Letter, supra note 2. Patent law creates a negative right in the patent
owner to exclude others from making, using, or selling the patented product. See infra note
56 and accompanying text.
50. See Engelberg Letter, supra note 2.
5 1. See Dale, supra note 18.
52. See Cipro Prices, supra note 5.
53. See Park, supra note 19, at 128-29 ("Patent-protected antiretrovirals are
exorbitantly priced, which makes them effectively inaccessible to those in need until their
patents expire and generics can be produced.").
54. See DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 59 (2d ed.
2001)[hereinafter CHISUM, PRINCIPLES]; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("To promote
the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors
the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.").
55. See Park, supra note 19, at 129.
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developed.56 But no uniform international patent system exists, so
inventors are required to file patent applications in each country in
which they seek protection.
57
Some countries, such as Brazil and India, offer practically no
patent protection for products.58 India does not provide protection for
processes, allowing any drug company to manufacture a product
through any means.59  Brazil, not granting protection for
pharmaceuticals prior to accession to the TRIPS Agreement, allowed
the manufacture of any drug, with international patents pre-dating its
accession, inside its country. 60 Through manufacturing generic drugs,
therefore, India and Brazil can offer pharmaceuticals at lower prices to
its residents and to poorer neighboring countries. 6 1  Pharmaceutical
companies face substantial losses in markets such as these.62
Consequently, the United States and the European Union have directed
their efforts toward an international agreement on intellectual property
rights.63
B. The TRIPS Agreement
1. TRIPS on Intellectual Property
The TRIPS Agreement 64 is the most comprehensive international
agreement on intellectual property.65 The World Trade Organization
56. See CHISUM, PRINCIPLES, supra note 54, at 2; see also 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1994)
(granting patent owners "the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or
selling the invention").
57. See 4 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS, § 14.02 (2001).
58. See Park, supra note 19, at 139-41.
59. See David K. Tomar, A Look Into the WTO Pharmaceutical Patent Dispute
Between the United States and India, 17 WIS. INT'L L.J. 579, 592 (1999). A "product," or a
"manufacture" as listed under U.S. Patent Law in 35 U.S.C. § 101, refers to articles of
manufacture made "for use from raw or prepared materials." American Fruit Growers, Inc.
v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1, 11 (1931). For example, a single tablet of aspirin is an article or
manufacture made from prepared materials, and hence, a product. A "process" refers to "a
mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a given result. It is an act, or series of
acts, performed upon the subject-matter to be transformed and reduced to a different state of
thing." Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1876). For example, the chemical treatment
employed in a series of steps to transform the materials into a tablet of aspirin is a process.
60. See JOHN R. THOMAS, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: HIV/AIDS DRUGS, PATENTS
AND THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: ISSUES AND OPTIONS (2001), available at
http://rxpolicy.comlstudies/crs-aidspatentstrips-0701 .pdf (last visited July 10, 2002).
61. See Tomar, supra note 59, at 592.
62. See Park, supra note 19, at 129.
63. See id at 130.
64. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Dec. 15,
1993, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].
65. See World Trade Org., Overview: The TRIPS Agreement, available at
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(WTO) created the TRIPS Agreement in an attempt to establish an
internationally uniform intellectual property rights standard66 that
formally links intellectual property laws with international trade.67 The
agreement sets out three main features: (1) a minimum standard of
protection to be provided by each WTO member country for patents,
copyrights, and trademarks; (2) domestic procedures for the
enforcement of intellectual property rights; and (3) dispute settlement
procedures. 68 In addition, the agreement allows member countries to
use trade sanctions to enforce their intellectual property rights. 69
Unlike other treaties of its kind, the TRIPS Agreement directly
regulates intellectual property protection as applied to WTO member
countries.7 °
Under Article 27(1) of the TRIPS Agreement, 71 member countries
must make patents, including pharmaceutical patents, available for
inventions that are novel, involve an inventive step, and are capable of
industrial application "whether [the inventions are] products or
processes, in all fields of technology., 72 The patent owner is granted
"exclusive rights ... to prevent third parties, not having the owner's
consent from the acts of: making, using, offering for sale, selling, or
importing" the protected process or product. 73 The Agreement does not
allow discrimination of protection for locally produced products over
imported ones.74 Patents under the TRIPS Agreement are valid for a
term of twenty years from the filing date.75
The WTO created the TRIPS Agreement in part to persuade
developing countries to establish their own intellectual property laws in
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/tripse/intel2_e.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2002)
[hereinafter TRIPS Overview]. The TRIPS Agreement came into effect on January 1, 1995.
See id
66. See Vincent Chiapetta, The Desirability ofAgreeing to Disagree: The WTO, TRIPS,
International IPR Exhaustion and a Few Other Things, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L. 333, 334
(2000).
67. See Robert J. Gutowski, The Marriage of Intellectual Property and International
Trade in the TRIPS Agreement: Strange Bedfellows or a Match Made in Heaven?, 47 BUFF.
L. REv. 713, 714-15 (1999).
68. See Chiapetta, supra note 66, at 342-46.
69. See Gutowski, supra note 67, at 714-15.
70. See John E. Giust, Noncompliance with TRIPS by Developed and Developing
Countries: Is TRIPS Working?, 8 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 69, 71 (1997).
71. See TRIPS, supra note 64, at art. 27, para. 1.
72. Id.
73. Id. at art. 28, paras. l(a)-(b).
74. See TRIPS Overview, supra note 65. Thus, a member country may not issue patent
protection for its own citizens' inventions while not protecting the inventions from other
countries. See id.
75. See TRIPS, supra note 64, at art. 33.
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compliance with minimum standards. 76  However, as developing
countries create patent protection for pharmaceuticals, drug prices
inevitably increase.77 Anticipating continuing need for developing
countries to obtain pharmaceuticals at cheaper prices, the TRIPS
Agreement includes several exceptions to alleviate the financial strain
associated with patented drugs.
78
2. Exceptions in the Agreement
The first noteworthy exception contained in the TRIPS Agreement
is the public welfare guideline. 79 This exception allows WTO members
to legislate any measures "necessary to protect public health and
nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital
importance to their socio-economic and technological development,
provided that such measures are consistent with the provisions of this
Agreement.,
80
Secondly, as established January 1, 1994, Article 65 sets forth that
all WTO member countries must comply with the provisions of the
TRIPS Agreement within one year from signing the Agreement,8 but
also allows developing member countries to delay implementation of
these provisions for up to an additional four years.8 2 Article 65 further
grants an additional five-year delay for technology not patentable in a
member country at the time of the formation of the TRIPS
Agreement.83 Thus, a developing member country that signed the
Agreement at its inception may have until January 1, 2005, to
completely comply with the Agreement standards, including those
pertaining to protecting pharmaceutical products and processes.
Article 66 provides even greater accommodation to the poorest, least
developed countries, allowing the country ten years from the date of
application to comply with the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement in
their entirety.84 In a recent effort to lend further support to these least
developed nations, the WTO amended Article 66, extending the
deadline for complete compliance to January 1, 2 0 16 .5
The most significant and controversial exception found in the
76. See Giust, supra note 70, at 70.
77. See Park, supra note 19, at 131.
78. See id.
79. See TRIPS, supra note 64, at art. 8.
80. Id. at art. 8, para. 1.
81. See id. at art. 65, para. 1.
82. See id, para. 2.
83. See id, para. 4.
84. See id. at art. 66, para. 2.
85. See Doha, supra note 11, at para. 7.
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TRIPS Agreement is the allowance of compulsory licensing.86
Compulsory licensing permits a government or government-appointed
third party to use a patented product or process without a license for the
product's use8 7  with the patent owner entitled to reasonable
compensation but not the ability to prevent the government or third
party from using the product. 88 Furthermore, a third party authorized to
use the patent cannot be sued for infringement. 89
Compulsory licensing is subject to limitations. First, a member
country may use compulsory licensing only in a time of "national
emergency" or in cases of "public non-commercial use," 90 in which
case member countries must make an effort to obtain authorization
from the patent holder prior to use. 91  Every authorization of
compulsory licensing must be considered independently on its own
merits.92 Furthermore, compulsory licensing may be imposed only for
domestic use, 93  and the patent owner must receive adequate
compensation.94 Finally, the license must be "terminated if and when
the circumstances which led to [the license] cease to exist and are
unlikely to recur." 95  The WTO further advises that although the
provisions of the TRIPS Agreement permit these exceptions, each
exception should be "read together with the related provisions of
Article 27(1), which require that patent rights shall be enjoyable
without discrimination as to the field of technology... whether
86. See TRIPS, supra note 64, at art. 31. This exception encompassing compulsory
licensing is enumerated in Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement. See id.
87. See id.
88. See id. para. (h).
89. See id. at art. 31.
90. See id. para. (b). The definition of "public non-commercial use" varies from
country to country. Generally, a "public non-commercial use" is the use of a patented
technology with the primary purpose to serve the general public while not promoting the
commercial success of a private company. Some countries interpret a public use to include
any public interest, public welfare issue, government service or use, or even military use.
See James Love, Compulsory Licensing: Models for State Practice in Developing Countries,
Access to Medicine and Compliance with the WTO TRIPS Accord (Jan. 21, 2001), available
at www.cptech.org/ip/health/cl/recommendedstatepractice.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2002)
[hereinafter Love, Models].
91. See TRIPS, supra note 64, at art. 31, para. (b).
92. See id. para. (a). Thus, each act of compulsory licensing is subject to independent
review. See TRIPS Overview, supra note 65.
93. See TRIPS, supra note 64, at art. 31, para. (f). Therefore, a nation issuing a
compulsory license may only do so to use a patented invention for its own use and not to aid
neighboring countries or to sell for profit to any other country. See TRIPS Overview, supra
note 65.
94. See TRIPS, supra 64, at art. 31, para. (h).
95. Id. para. (g). Thus, at the end of any national emergency the use of the license must
be terminated unless further approval is granted by the patent owner. See TRIPS Overview,
supra note 65.
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products are imported or locally produced., 96  Hence, the TRIPS
Agreement, while expressing the importance of a patent owner's rights,
defines exceptions to patent monopolies to allow a member country to
obtain less costly medications through the use of specific compulsory
licensing provisions.9'
C. TRIPS and Beyond: United States Policy and Reaction Abroad
The TRIPS Agreement provides that member countries may grant
intellectual property protection beyond the minimum standard required
by the TRIPS Agreement.9 8 Member countries are also permitted to
negotiate amongst themselves for greater protection. 99 The United
States has thus attempted to negotiate changes in the patent laws of
various nations that would preclude these nations from granting
compulsory licenses on patented drugs. 00 Negotiation strategies of the
United States often involve threats of trade sanctions or complex
litigation through the WTO dispute resolution system.01
The United States' effort to negotiate with other countries for
patent rights is based primarily on the growth of the pharmaceutical
industry in the United States.' 0 2  The Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) has reported that a new drug
takes twelve to fifteen years to develop at a cost of $500 million.
10 3
Although at great financial expense, research and development in the
United States has yielded approximately 50% of all new commercial
96. TRIPS Overview, supra note 65.
97. See Park, supra note 19, at 131 ("Compulsory licensing also assists countries in
increasing access to cheaper drugs.").
98. See TRIPS, supra note 64, at art. 1, para. 1 ("Members may implement in their
domestic law more extensive protection than is required by this Agreement.").
99. See Harrelson, supra note 10, at 188-189. TRIPS serves as a minimum standard for
patent protection and as such any country can adopt greater protection for itself and
negotiate with other member countries to do the same. See id.
100. See id. at 189. In these trade negotiations, the United States often uses threats of
trade sanctions with countries not willing to legislate stricter patent protection. See id.; see
also infra Parts II.C. 1-3.
101. See Park, supra note 19, at 134.
102. See George K. Foster, Opposing Forces in a Revolution in International Patent
Protection: The U.S. and India in the Uruguay Round and its Aftermath, 3 UCLA J. INT'L
L. & FOREIGN AFF. 283, 297-98 (1998). See also Park, supra note 19, at 129 ("Without the
protection of patents, pharmaceutical companies risk losing millions of dollars as companies
that did not have to undertake the costly research and development produce and sell the
same drug at lower costs.").
103. See The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), A
Monthly Report from America's Pharmaceutical Companies (Mar. 2001), available at
http://www.phrma.org/publications/documents/factsheets//2001-03-01.210.phtml (last
visited Jan. 17, 2002).
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pharmaceuticals developed worldwide in the last twenty years. 10 4
Further, exportation accounts for approximately 40% of industry-wide
sales of U.S. pharmaceuticals.
10 5
Some foreign drug companies illegally copy and manufacture
these drugs in an effort to reduce the cost of drugs by avoiding patent
licensing fees. 10 6  As a result of these practices, pharmaceutical
companies in the United States lose approximately $5 billion
annually. 10 7 According to the International Trade Commission, U.S.
drug companies would be able to invest an estimated $900 million into
the development of new medicines with these lost revenues.10 8 Thus,
the United States, seeking to recoup the financial losses of the
pharmaceutical industry and prevent further losses, gives great
attention to the international effort to strengthen intellectual property
protection in foreign trade policy.109
In a further attempt to persuade developing countries to strengthen
their patent laws, the United States amended section 301 of the U.S.
Trade Act of 1974110 to allow trade sanctions against countries that
manufacture, import, or export U.S. patented pharmaceuticals."1
Under section 301, the United States Trade Representative (USTR)"12
may extend investigative efforts to uncover countries that offend
intellectual property rights, based on allegations by citizen petitions 
3
or on its own initiative.'1 4 The USTR identifies suspect countries and
compiles a "watch list '1 15 of those countries against which trade
sanctions may be imposed if the countries fail to make necessary
104. See The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), U.S. is
the World Leader in Drug Innovation (Dec. 1999), available at
http://www.phrma.org/publications/backgrounders/world/12_global.phtml (last visited Jan.
17, 2002).
105. See Foster, supra note 102, at 297.
106. See id. at 296.
107. See id. at 297-98.
108. See id. at 298.
109. See id.
110. See 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (2001).
111. See Judy Rein, International Governance Through Trade Agreements: Patent
Protection for Essential Medicines, 21 Nw. J. INT'L. L. & Bus. 379, 399 (2001). This
amendment, enacted in 1988, is commonly referred to as "Special 301." See id.
112. The USTR is a cabinet member of the executive branch who develops and
maintains U.S. international trade and investment policy and directs negotiations with other
countries in these affairs. See Office of the United States Trade Representative, About the
USTR, available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-ustr/ustrrole.shtml (last visited July 10,
2002).
113. See 19 U.S.C. §2412(a) (2002).
114. See Rein, supra note 111, at 399.
115. See 19 U.S.C. § 2411(c) (2001).
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changes in their patent laws.116 For a developing nation seeking trade
alliances to promote its own welfare, placement on such a list would
have a "chilling effect" on its growth.1 17 Thailand and South Africa are
two nations that have responded to such action.
1. South Africa
The United States and South Africa have been involved in a
dispute over the compulsory licensing of HIV treatments since South
Africa passed the Medicines and Related Substances Amendment Act
101 in 1997.118 In an effort to alleviate the spread of HIV by supplying
affordable medicine to its citizens, South Africa enacted this legislation
to permit the Minister of Health, at his discretion, to call for
compulsory licensing of medication. 1 9 The new law allows the
Minister to use compulsory licensing to import medication
manufactured by a country other than South Africa. 120  The United
States quickly used section 301 to threaten South Africa with trade
sanctions and placed the country on the "watch list."' 21 The USTR
based its retaliatory claims on the questionable compliance of the Act
with the restrictive TRIPS Agreement with respect to compulsory
licensing. 122
The United States did not dispute that South Africa could have
called upon the TRIPS Agreement to grant compulsory licensing to
drug manufacturers in times of national emergency.1 23 However, the
United States alleged that the Act used illegal methods of compulsory
licensing not in compliance with the standards outlined in the
Agreement. 24 After much political pressure from other world trade
leaders, the United States reevaluated its position and removed South
Africa from the "watch list.' 25 However, the United States continues
116. See Rein, supra note 111, at 399.
117. See id at 400.
118. See Park, supra note 19, at 136. The Medicines and Related Substances
Amendment Act 101 is also referred to as Article 15(C). See id.
119. See Rein, supra note 111, at 400.
120. See id. at 400-01. This effort is known as parallel licensing. The TRIPS
Agreement does not prohibit this practice but it is disfavored by the United States as a
further form of compulsory licensing. See id.
121. See Harrelson, supra note 10, at 185 (Placement on the "watch list" is a "precursor
to trade sanctions.").
122. See Rein, supra note 111, at 401 ("[T]he USTR placed South Africa on its 'Watch
List,' implicating the [Article 15(C)] 'ill-defined authority to issue compulsory licenses,
authorize parallel imports and potentially otherwise abrogate patent rights."').
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. See Harrelson, supra note 10, at 185.
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its surveillance of South Africa's use of compulsory licensing. 126
2. Thailand
Thailand is another developing country in need of affordable HIV
medication, with an estimated 700,000 people infected with HIV.
27
The HIV medication didanosine (ddl), developed and patented by
Bristol-Myers-Squibb, costs $1.25 per tablet and has a recommended
daily dosage of four tablets. 128 Treatment costs of $5.00 per day are
affordable by less than 10% of Thais infected. 129 Unlike South Africa,
Thailand has the ability to make generic ddl at reduced cost to the
public.'
30
In 1999, the Thai government originally decided to issue a
compulsory license but abandoned its plans after the United States
threatened to place Thailand on the section 301 "watch list."'
31
Thailand's developing economy depends on the United States as
Thailand exports 25% of its goods to the United States.132 The threat of
trade sanctions would have a tremendous impact on Thailand.
33
Hence, patent-owning pharmaceutical companies have forced Thais to
pay the often unaffordable price of non-generic drugs. 134 In January
2000, after political pressure from other trading nations, the United
States lessened its pressure on Thailand and agreed to allow Thailand
to produce generic ddl. 35  This agreement was contingent on
Thailand's following the compulsory licensing protocols of the TRIPS
Agreement, including paying adequate compensation to the rightful
patent owner.136
3. India
The United States has applied similar pressure to India with
respect to its extensive generic drug industry. 37 India is one of the
leading producers of generic drugs in the world, and its prices remain
126. See id.
127. See UNAIDS, supra note 22, at 19.
128. See Frank Ching, Eye on Asia: Drug Patents vs. Human Rights, FAR E. ECON. REV.
(Feb. 17, 2000), available at 2000 WL-FEER 8518035 (cited in Harrelson, supra note 10, at
185-86.)
129. See id.
130. See id
131. See Rein, supra note 111, at 402-3.
132. See id
133. See id
134. See Ching, supra note 128.
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. See Tomar, supra note 59, at 582-83.
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among the lowest 138 because of its extremely low investment in
research and development.1 39 India's weak patent laws protect only the
manufacturing process of the drug, not the product itself, allowing
Indian companies to produce pharmaceuticals by a different process
without paying any licensing fees or investing time and money in
research.140 These laws allow Indian companies simply to copy drugs,
enabling them to produce drugs at a lower cost than their foreign
competitors.14 1 Consequently, the United States has placed India on its
section 301 "watch list" until India agrees to strengthen its patent laws
to provide adequate royalties to American pharmaceutical producers. 
142
D. The United States' First Steps
As an attempt to yield to the needs of global health crises, the
United States has begun to decrease its opposition to compulsory
licensing of pharmaceuticals when necessary to combat disease in a
"national emergency."'143 On December 1, 1999, at the Seattle WTO
Ministerial Conference, the United States announced it would penrit
trade policy to ensure that developing nations would have the necessary
medication to fight national epidemics. 144 In May of 2000, President
Bill Clinton prohibited all United States government agencies from
acting as obstacles to supplying needed anti-AIDS drugs in South
Africa. 145 This executive order effectively removed all United States
opposition to the method of compulsory licensing as articulated in the
TRIPS Agreement. 46 In fact, the United States now makes available
$1 billion in annual loans to help South Africa purchase patented
pharmaceuticals to fight the AIDS crisis.
47
Although the United States appears to have eased its pressure on
the international pharmaceutical trade market, other countries are
138. See id
139. See id at 582.
140. See id. at 583.
141. See id.
142. See Park, supra note 19, at 140 (The USTR placed India on the "watch list" "for its
lack of protection for patented pharmaceutical drugs.").
143. See Harrelson, supra note 10, at 186 ("As evidenced in the change in position by
the United States in its disputes with South Africa and Thailand, the United States'
opposition to compulsory licensing is decreasing.").
144. See Rein, supra note 111, at 403.
145. See Harrelson, supra note 10, at 186. However, there is no identifiable support to
substantiate President Clinton's plea. In addition, President Clinton was quick to declare
that the order does not weaken the protection of intellectual property rights. See id.
146. See Rein, supra note 111, at 403.
147. See Harrelson, supra note 10, at 186.
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skeptical about the United States' sincerity. 148 The U.S. policy remains
uncertain because it has articulated no standards for compulsory
licensing. 149 Therefore, when a developing nation issues a compulsory
license, it must be willing to face challenges from the United States
that resemble those under section 301.150 The developing nation must
balance on a "tightrope between pressing health needs, increasing
pressures from domestic constituencies and the cost of challenging
international pharmaceutical interests."' 5
1
AIDS activist groups argue that the $1 billion U.S. government
loan to Africa prioritizes patented drug profits over human health
concerns. 52  Activists also contend that loan assistance is actually a
method of increasing the reduced pharmaceutical prices that have
resulted from the compulsory licensing because the loan simply
enables developing nations to afford the patent owners' high royalty
fees. 153 Further, activists argue that the use of compulsory licensing
instead of loan programs would better permit developing countries to
gain control over the availability of affordable drugs, thus ensuring low
prices rather than relying on governmental funding to the patent
owner. 
154
The current application of international intellectual property
rights, treaties, and agreements governing the use of compulsory
licensing creates the possibility that many people in developing nations
will not be able to obtain life-saving pharmaceuticals. However, under
less restrictive intellectual property regulations, American
pharmaceutical companies might not be able to recover expensive
research and development costs, making these companies less likely to
invest in attempts to discover new medications. All of these factors
point to the need for a better balance between allowing compulsory
licensing of pharmaceuticals and providing patent owners sufficient
royalties to continue research.
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM
The TRIPS Agreement became the most comprehensive
international agreement on intellectual property,155 creating uniform
148. See Harrelson, supra note 10, at 186; see also Rein, supra note 111, at 403-4.
149. See Rein, supra note 111, at 403-04.
150. See Rein, supra note 111, at 404.
151. Id.
152. See AIDS Groups Slam U.S. $1 Billion for Africa, Marketletter (Jul., 31, 2000),
available at 2000 WL 7542853 (cited in Harrelson, supra note 10, at 186).
153. Seeid.
154. See Rein, supra note 111, at 403.
155. See TRIPS Overview, supra note 65.
[Vol. 43
2002] DRUGS FOR PROFIT V DRUGS FOR HEALTH 305
intellectual property rights 56 while formally linking intellectual
property laws with international trade. 157 The Doha WTO Ministerial
Conference in November 2001 recognized the "gravity of the public
health problems afflicting many developing and least-developed
countries."'158 It emphasized the importance of the TRIPS Agreement's
inclusion in any international solution aimed at helping developing
nations gain access to patented pharmaceuticals. 159  The Conference
further recognized the importance of intellectual property in the
process of developing new pharmaceuticals and the effect of patent
rights on the costs of drugs. 60 It reaffirmed the TRIPS Agreement as a
means to support each WTO member's need to protect public health
and promote access to necessary medicine.' 6' More importantly, the
Conference reaffirmed each member's right to use compulsory
licensing to gain access to affordable medications in a time of national
emergency. 62  At the same time, it recognized the difficulties that
developing member countries face in making effective use of such
compulsory licensing and called the Council for TRIPS to find a
remedy.
163
The United States' long-standing opposition to the practice of
compulsory licensing has become an impediment to developing
nations' abilities to obtain greatly needed pharmaceuticals. 64  The
fervent efforts of the United States to recover research and
development costs from international sales of U.S. patented
pharmaceuticals have resulted in other nations being confronted with
the threat of placement on the section 301 "watch list.' 65 Although the
United States has shown signs of increasing compassion toward
developing countries' needs for affordable drugs, it remains steadfast in
156. See Chiapetta, supra note 66, at 334.
157. See Gutowski, supra note 67, at 714-15.
158. Doha, supra note 11, at para. 1.
159. See id. ("We stress the need for the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights to be part of the.., action to address these problems.").
160. See id. para. 3 ("We recognize that intellectual property protection is important for
the development of new medicines. We also recognize the concerns about its effects on
prices.").
161. See id. para. 4 ("We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not
prevent members from taking measures to protect public health.").
162. See id. paras. 5(b)-(c) ("[E]ach member has the right to grant compulsory licenses"
and "the right to determine what constitutes a national emergency. ").
163. See id. para. 6. See also Doha, supra note 11 and accompanying text.
164. See Ed Silverman, A Battered Bayer Opts Out of a Fight Over Its Cipro Patent,
STAR-LEDGER (Oct. 25, 2001), available at
http://www.nj.com/business/ledger/index.ssf?/business/ledger/14d2b51.html (last visited
Jan. 16, 2002). See also Dale, supra note 18 and accompanying text.
165. See supra Part II.C.
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the requirement of guaranteeing payment of adequate compensation to
patent owners. 166 As demonstrated in Thailand, adding compensation
of royalty fees to the price of the generic drug may actually increase
the price of the generic drug to a level nearly equivalent to that of the
original brand-name patented drug. 167 If drug prices continue to remain
high because of expensive royalty fees, developing nations, such as
Thailand, will continue to be unable to access critical medication.
68
The dilemma remains: What remedy reduces costs of patented life-
saving drugs through compulsory licensing while adequately
compensating patent owners to encourage future development of
critically needed pharmaceuticals?
IV. ANALYSIS
The WTO Conference at Doha issued a decree to the Council for
TRIPS to find an effective means to support developing member
countries, particularly those countries with little or no drug
manufacturing capabilities, to implement effective compulsory
licensing. 169  Although compulsory licensing by a WTO member
country is permitted by the TRIPS Agreement, it contradicts some
rights of the patent holder.170  A patent grants the owner a right to
exclude anyone from practicing the invention claimed in the patent. 171
The compulsory license provision partially removes this ability to
exclude others. 72 Such a solution would require ensuring that rightful
patent owners are adequately compensated as required by the TRIPS
Agreement. 173 Therefore, careful examination of various solutions for
developing nations is needed to evaluate the balance between the use of
compulsory licensing to reduce the cost of medication against the
guarantee of adequate compensation to patent owners.
A. Establishing a Patent System for Developing Countries
One solution is to use the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement that
allow great discretion in member countries' methods of operation and
administration of compulsory licensing under a national patent
166. See Rein, supra note 111, at 403-4.
167. See supra Part II.C.2.
168. See Park, supra note 19, at 125.
169. See Doha, supra note 11, at para. 6.
170. See Harrelson, supra note 10, at 182.
171. See CHISUM, PRINCIPLES, supra note 54, at 59; see also supra note 56 and
accompanying text.
172. See Harrelson, supra note 10, at 182.
173. See TRIPS, supra note 64, at art. 31, para. (h).
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system. 174 But an individual national system that provides access to
patented inventions and establishes a system of patent laws is given
more weight in circumstances of licensing than are the specific TRIPS
guidelines. 175  The TRIPS Agreement is administered only as a
compliment to national systems to provide a minimum standard of
effective intellectual property law. 17 6  However, under the TRIPS
Agreement a member must issue patents on pharmaceuticals, 177 for
example, because without an issued patent a member cannot issue a
compulsory license and therefore cannot obtain medicines at reduced
cost.i18 Thus, each member nation must maintain some minimal patent
law system.
Unfortunately, patent law systems are expensive to employ and
maintain, much like the process of litigation. 79  Most developing
countries lack the financial resources necessary to establish a patent
system, much less to enforce one. 8° James Love of Consumer Project
on Technology developed the following solution that is designed to
allow developing nations, with limited resources, to invest in
intellectual property law systems without litigation.'18
1. Inexpensive Administrative Costs
The model of patent systems for developing countries should be
based on administrative processes182 Pharmaceutical companies
routinely litigate intellectual property matters, and thus are skilled in
taking advantage of gaps in the law at the expense of their
competitors. 183 An administrative process can be used to regulate the
system without this litigation. 8 4 Developing countries need to create
intellectual property systems that are inexpensive to operate and not
easily challenged by litigation of complex rules and regulations. 185
An intellectual property system based on administrative processes
174. See Love, Models, supra note 90, at para. 3.
175. See id.
176. See id. para. 4.
177. See id para. 12.
178. See id.
179. See id. para. 8-9. The Ufiited States spends approximately $1 billion annually
maintaining the Patent and Trademark Office. Litigation expenses are also high with costs
of an average patent litigation currently at $2.4 million. See id.
180. See Love, Models, supra note 90, at para. 8-11.
181. See id para. 14.
182. See id para. 15.
183. See id.
184. See id.
185. See id.
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is permitted under the TRIPS Agreement. 186 The TRIPS Agreement
requires that the processes be "fair, transparent, and accountable."
187
Thus, the developing nation must describe the basic processes involved
in the administration of the laws. 188 The process must be centered on
written regulations and decisions permitting uniform awareness of the
law. 189 In addition, hearings must be available and an appeals process
must include "independent review by a distinct higher authority."' 190
An appellate process ensures that the system correctly employs the use
of compulsory licensing and is fair to all parties involved.191
An administrative process incorporating these principles would
enable an appointed officer to make straightforward decisions based on
known, written procedures and would also grant an independent person
or board the ability to review and modify the officer's decisions. t92
Although the process could also allow further appeals to the nation's
judiciary, the appellate review included in the administrative process
would adequately serve most parties. 193 Hence, such a process would
reduce litigation in the nation's court system and decrease
administrative costs of the nation's patent system.
2. Government-Use Provision
The TRIPS Agreement permits governments great discretion in
issuing compulsory licenses for public non-commercial uses.' 94 This is
known as a government-use provision. For example, following the
TRIPS Agreement, the United States provides accessible requirements
for the issuance of compulsory licenses for public non-commercial uses
of patents. 195 However, it is imperative that government-use provisions
186. See Love, Models, supra note 90, at para. 17. The TRIPS Agreement permits
administrative practices on all Article 31 decisions, including interpreting rules and
regulations, setting forth compensation, and conducting appellate procedures. See id.
187. Id. Thus, parties involved must be able to rely on written records and decisions to
provide some type of standard. See id. See also TRIPS, supra note 64, at art. 41.
188. See Love, Models, supra note 90, at para. 17.
189. See id.
190. Id. para. 20. For example, the law could appoint an officer to make initial decisions
and another independent committee to review and modify the initial decision. Likewise,
appeals could be sent to the national court system for review as long as the standards of
appeal are explicitly set forth. See id. para. 20. See also TRIPS, supra note 64, at art. 3 1,
paras. (i)-(j).
191. See Love, Models, supra note 90, at para. 20.
192. See id
193. See id
194. See id. para. 23. For example, the United States allows any government official
authorized to sign contracts to issue a compulsory license of a patent. Each agency may have
additional guidelines, but, generally, the power granted is broad. See id. para. 18.
195. See id. para. 24.
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are lawful and enforceable, without exceptions or loopholes, or in
other words, they must be "strong laws. 196
The "strong law" models of Europe and the United States allow
the government to license the patent for any public non-commercial
purpose during a time of national emergency, without requiring
negotiations with the patent owner for licensing. 197 Further, these
models do not allow the patent owners to prohibit government use
through injunctive relief,198 but the government must notify the patent
owner soon after using the patented technology. 199 If the compulsory
license is intended to permit a non-government third party commercial
use of a patent, authorization may require more restrictions to protect
the patent owner.
200
Following the TRIPS Agreement, even if the patent owner has not
agreed to the use of the patent, he must be paid an adequate royalty as
though he had approved the license. 20  Thus, the developing nation
should provide the government broad power to utilize patents for
public non-commercial use 202 to promote efficiency in the issuance of
compulsory licenses.
3. National Emergencies
In addition to a provision authorizing the use of patents by the
government for public non-commercial use, it is necessary that each
nation's patent system allow the issuance of compulsory licenses
during times of widespread health crisis.203 Article 31 (b) of the TRIPS
Agreement allows the same broad government discretion for times of
crisis as for public non-commercial use.204 By announcing a state of
national emergency, however, the developing nation can authorize a
third party to provide an adequate supply of medication without any
negotiation with the patent owner.20 5 The patent owner is entitled to a
reasonable royalty, but the absence of negotiation saves time in getting
the drug to market and likely increases the supply of the drug because
196. See id. paras. 7, 15.
197. See Love, Models, supra note 90, at para. 15; see also TRIPS, supra note 64, at art.
31, para. (b).
198. See Love, Models, supra note 90, at para. 24.
199. See TRIPS, supra note 64, at art. 31, para. (b).
200. See Love, Models, supra note 90, at para. 19. For example, in Belgium a
committee including consumer, labor, and small business interests are consulted prior to
allowance of a compulsory license to a third party. See id.
201. See id. para. 24.
202. See id. para. 31.
203. See id. para. 15.
204. See id
205. See id.
SANTA CLARA LA W REVIEW
more generic drug manufacturers may compete in the market.2 °6 Thus,
laws enacted to allow issue of compulsory licenses by the government
in times of national emergency allow the persons affected by such
emergencies rapid access to medication.
4. Patent Owner Compensation
The developing nation's intellectual property law must include a
"predictable system" for determining royalty compensation.20 7 Article
3 1 (h) of the TRIPS Agreement requires the rightful patent holder to be
"paid adequate remuneration" for the unauthorized use of a patent.20 8
A standard compensation guideline to determine royalties is the
preferred method to provide patent owners with "predictability and
transparency" in the law. 20 9  Such a system also allows for quick
decision making by the administration, thus allowing the needed drugs
to reach the market without unnecessary delay.210  The royalty
guidelines can be based on reasonable royalties known to the
industry. 21 1  Royalty rates differ from country to country but are
typically about 4% within the pharmaceutical industry.
212
Furthermore, national patent law systems must require patent
owners seeking royalties to provide the government information about
the patented drug prior to receiving compensation.213 The actual costs
of research and development, along with data regarding the sales of the
product since market introduction, should be part of the required
disclosure.2t 4 Disclosure would permit public understanding of the
economics of pharmaceutical research and development and provide a
check on the pharmaceutical companies wishing to market products in
206. See Love, Models, supra note 90, at para. 15.
207. See id. Such a "predictable" system would include a written, published, pre-
determined royalty payment scale to be paid to any inventor seeking remuneration for the
license used by the government under an issued compulsory license. See id.
208. See id. para. 36; see also TRIPS, supra note 64, at art. 31, para. (h).
209. See Love, Models, supra note 90, at para. 37.
210. See id.
211. See id. para. 39.
212. See id. The United States provides an average royalty rate to pharmaceutical
companies of five percent. Japan has variable rates from two to four percent. Germany has
rates from two to ten percent. However, developing nations should not be pressured into
paying royalty rates similar to those of developed nations. A recent royalty schedule that
was recommended to developing nations was a royalty of 3% to 5% for extremely useful
pharmaceuticals or those expensive to research and develop, a royalty of 2% to 3% for
newer pharmaceuticals and those with research funded in part by the governments, and a
royalty of 1% or less for minor or older pharmaceuticals. See id. para. 40.
213. See id. para. 42.
214. See Love, Models, supra note 90, at para. 42.
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the developing nation.215 Such transparent, standard royalty guidelines
would promote fast delivery of drugs to reach those in need.2 16
5. Drug Exportation
A nation's patent law system must also permit production of
pharmaceuticals for exportation.217  Article 31(k) of the TRIPS
Agreement allows such exportation if the administration of a country
finds that a single producer of a necessary therapeutic drug is
dominating production while restricting access to the drug.
218
Therefore, Article 3 1(k) renounces the restriction of Article 31 (f) that
compulsory licensing may only be authorized for the member country's
domestic use.219 In addition, Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement
provides for production of medications for exportation to address
public health needs in cases in which the export country gives patent
protection and adequate compensation to the rightful patent owner.
220
A developing country could afford domestic manufacturing of at least
some necessary drugs, and overproduction could permit some
exportation as market share could reach beyond the country's own
borders. Thus, by employing a more efficient, uninterrupted
production system as opposed to an alternating, non-continuous
system, lower operating costs would result.
B. Accessing U.S. Government-Funded Patents
The United States government invests a large number of taxpayer
dollars in research and development of health-promoting
pharmaceuticals, 221 and this government-supported research yields
many patentable products.222  In 1995, the United States spent $15.8
billion, approximately 44% of the nation's total expenditures for
215. See id.
216. See id para. 15.
217. Seeid
218. See id.
219. See TRIPS, supra note 64, at art. 31, paras. (f), (k). See also James Love,
Implementing TRIPS Safeguards with Particular Attention to Administrative Models for
Compulsory Licensing of Patents (Aug. 21, 2001), available at
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/c/harare-aug2001.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2002) ("Article
31(f) is waived when licenses are issued as a remedy to anticompetitive practices under
Article 31 (k).").
220. See Love, Models, supra note 90, at para. 15.
221. See Peter S. Amo & Michael H. Davis, Why Don't We Enforce Existing Drug Price
Controls? The Unrecognized and Unenforceable Reasonable Pricing Requirement Imposed
Upon Patents Deriving in Whole or in Part from Federally Funded Research, 75 TUL. L.
REv. 631, 636 (2001).
222. See id.
2002]
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health-related research and development, in drug development.223
Some of these advanced the development of pharmaceuticals, including
antibiotics used to treat the AIDS virus. 224  In the five year period
between 1987 and 1991, over 50% of all pharmaceuticals and 71% of
"significant drugs" were developed in the United States using
225government funding. Federal funding from taxes implies that the
public has both "moral and legal" claims on antibiotics that are
"government-funded inventions. '' 226  James Love has proposed a
solution taking into account U.S. taxpayer investment in patents.
The United States is granted patent rights for planned patents
obtained from federally funded research under the Bayh-Dole Act of
1980.227 The Act was developed to provide incentives for research and
development of new inventions while increasing the competitiveness of
U.S. industry as inventions are put into commercial use.228 The Act
then allows each business or non-profit organization the right to patent
the inventions.229
The United States, however, retains an irrevocable license to the
invention "on behalf of the United States and on behalf of any foreign
government or international organization pursuant to any existing or
future treaty or agreement with the United States. 23°  The United
States also retains the right to license these patents to other
governments "when necessary to fulfill health or safety needs. 231
Furthermore, the United States retains some royalties 232 and the right to
intervene when the patent owner refuses to provide the patented
223. See NAT'L INSTS. OF HEALTH, ESTIMATES OF NATIONAL SUPPORT FOR HEALTH
R&D BY SOURCE OR PERFORMER: FISCAL YEARS 1986-1995, available at
http://grants.nih.gov/grants/award/trends96/pdfdocs/FEDTABLA.PDF (last visited Jan. 17,
2002) (cited by Arno & Davis, supra note 221, at 636-37).
224. See Letter from Ralph Nader, James Love, Robert Weissman to Dr. Harold
Varmus, Director of NIH, asking for NIH to give the World Health Organization, WHO,
access to US government funded medical inventions, (Sept. 3, 1999), available at
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/sa/varmus-sep99.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2002)
[hereinafter LOVE, VARMUS LETTER]. The United States funded the research for AIDS
medication, including the patented drugs ddl, ddC, FddA, d4T, 3TC and others. See id.
225. See Arno & Davis, supra note 221, at 692 n.374.
226. See id. at 637.
227. See 35 U.S.C. § 200 (1994), cited in Arno & Davis, supra note 221, at 646.
However, the Bayh-Dole Act is limited to only patents obtained from research leading to
planned inventions. Hence, if inventions A, B, C, and D all stemmed from research with
federally funded money but only A was planned by the government, the U.S. could claim
rights to only invention A.
228. See id.
229. See 35 U.S.C. § 202(a) (1994), cited in Arno & Davis, supra note 221, at 646.
230. See 37 C.F.R. § 404.7(a)(2)(i) (2000).
231. See 37 C.F.R. § 404.7(a)(2)(ii) (2000).
232. See 37 C.F.R. § 401.5(g)(3) (2000), cited in Arno & Davis, supra note 221, at 647.
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product at a reasonable price to the public.
233
The rights of the United States under the Bayh-Dole Act have
largely remained unused and represent a predominantly untapped
234
resource to aid worldwide access to affordable medication.
Consumer advocates, including James Love, Ralph Nader, and Robert
Weissman, have suggested that the United States agree to allow the
World Heath Organization (WHO) the right to use government-funded
235patents.   These advocates claim the United States could supply
needed pharmaceuticals to developing nations pursuant to the rights of
the United States under the Bayh-Dole Act. 236  Consumer advocates
also submit that the WHO, with the use of government-funded patents,
would be able to organize production of government-funded
pharmaceuticals at a greatly reduced cost.237  This would allow
developing countries greater access to patented drugs without the
necessity of a large economy.238
However, the Bayh-Dole Act was never intended to be used to
promote competition between the government and individual patent
owners. 9 It permits only non-commercial research use of the drug
technology obtained from federal funding, not the use of the final
product. 240  Furthermore, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) is
restricted to licensing patent rights only in countries where the rightful
patent owners also have patent protection.24' Thus, these limitations of
the Bayh-Dole Act and the licensing arrangements permitted by the
NIH likely prohibit an assignment of patent rights to the WHO.2 42
233. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 201(f), 203 (1994), cited in Arno & Davis, supra note 221, at 647
nn.87, 93.
234. See Arno & Davis, supra note 221, at 639-40. The benefits from the Bayh-Dole
Act are adding up quickly. From 1993 to 1999, the royalties derived from inventions funded
by the government were $200 million, accounting for less than 1% of the NIH's investment.
However, most of the research funded resulted in patents for large corporations allowing
these companies to reap large profits from high drug prices. The Bayh-Dole Act permits the
government to recoup its investment from these corporate profits. See id.
235. See LOVE, VARMUS LETTER, supra note 224.
236. See id.
237. See id.
238. See id
239. See Letter from NIH Director, Dr. Harold Varmus to Ralph Nader, James Love, and
Robert Weissman responding to their request calling on the NIH to provide the World
Health Organization, WHO, access to US government funded medical inventions (1999),
available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/sa/varmusletteroctl9.html (last visited Jan 11,
2002).
240. See LOVE, VARMUS LETTER, supra note 224 ("It does not provide rights or access
to a licensee's final product.").
241. See id. ("NIH can only license or otherwise grant rights to patents in countries
where the agency or its grantees have sought and obtained patent protection.").
242. See Dolmo, supra note 21, at 161.
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Even if the NIH cannot assign rights to a final product, consumer
advocates believe that the United States and other developed nations
could enforce their patent rights under the Bayh-Dole Act to control the
rising prices of pharmaceuticals. 243 Although subject to procedures and
limitations,2 44 under the Act individual agencies can "march in" 245 to
review the prices of drugs developed in part with federal funding and
246require patent owners to demonstrate the fairness of their prices.
Agencies review prices as part of the Act to prevent profits resulting
from unreasonably high prices that gouge the public.247 In theory, the
government could regulate prices through their "march in" rights.
Much dispute exists over the price control mechanism working in
conjunction with the "march in" rights of the Act.248 In addition, the
pharmaceutical industry is "suspicious" of any United States "march
in" provision that claims control over the production, marketing, or
distribution of privately owned products in a free-trading economy. 249
The industry claims such control would devastate the efficiency and
resiliency of the industry.25°
The Act seeks to protect the public investment by ensuring fair
and reasonable prices on government-funded inventions.25' Consumer
advocates argue that a solution is to use the Bayh-Dole Act to reduce
pharmaceutical prices, thus making life-saving drugs accessible
throughout the world by using price control mechanisms.252
C. Implementing Tiered Pricing
A third solution posits a method for developing nations to gain
medication at more affordable prices while providing compensation to
the patent owners2 3 through the use of a tiered pharmaceutical pricing
system.254 Under such a system, controlled by private enterprises, the
243. See Arno & Davis, supra note 221, at 632-34. The courts have interpreted the Act
to allow patents to be "available to the public on reasonable terms" to mean the patents are
available to the public at a reasonable price. See id. at 651.
244. See id. at 647-48.
245. See id at 648, 653.
246. See id. at 653.
247. See id at 663.
248. See id. at 681-82. There has been only one case on "march in" rights, but the
opinion did not announce a clear standard as to the proper mechanism of the implementation
of these rights (citing John Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, 978 F. Supp. 184 (D. Del. 1997)). See
id.
249. See Arno & Davis, supra note 221, at 660-61.
250. See id.
251. See id at 684.
252. See id at 692.
253. See Harrelson, supra note 10, at 195.
254. See id.
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pharmaceutical companies would set the prices of a patented drug
higher in developed, industrialized countries than in developing
215
countries.
256This idea is not novel. Pharmaceutical companies already set
drug prices in each country based upon the amount of competition
257present in that country for the same medication. For example, the
anthrax medication Cipro sells for $1.51 per tablet in Poland where a
competing manufacturer produces a generic version for a lower price,
while in the United States, where the patented drug has no competition,
the cost per tablet is $4.67.258 This amounts to a price difference of
over 300%. Likewise, the common AIDS medication AZT sells in
Spain for 273% more than it does in Thailand simply because Spain
does not have any competing manufacturers. 9
Supporters of tiered pricing believe it can provide drugs to
developing nations and simultaneously provide profits to patent
owners, although the profits may not be as large as drug companies
desire.26 ° Pharmaceutical companies, however, are not so sure.26'
Economists have calculated that the average South African could not
afford to pay even 10% of the cost of AIDS medication in the United
States.26 2 Thus, economists postulate that the profit made on drugs sold
to developing nations would be insignificant.263  Pharmaceutical
companies would have to exercise tiered pricing with caution.
Pharmaceutical companies foresee the potential drawback of a
practice known as parallel importing. 264 In a tiered-pricing system it
would be possible in extreme circumstances 265 for a distributor to
purchase the patented drug in a developing nation for a low price and
266then resell the drug in a developed nation for less than market price.
255. See id.
256. See id.
257. See id.
258. See Cipro Prices, supra note 5.
259. See Harrelson, supra note 10, at 195.
260. See id at 196.
261. See id.
262. See id. at 195-96.
263. See id. at 196.
264. See Harrelson, supra note 10, at 196. Parallel importation is the practice in which
countries or buyers search the world for low cost drugs and import them into its own nation
rather than buying the same drugs domestically at a higher cost. This practice effectively
lowers the cost of drugs and is viewed favorably by developing nations. See Dolmo, supra
note 21, at 137-38.
265. An example of an extreme circumstance would be one requiring the distribution of
AIDS medication in developing nations at a tenth of the cost of the drug in a developed
nation such as the United States. See Harrelson, supra note 10, at 196.
266. See Harrelson, supra note 10, at 196.
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This practice would serve to drive down prices in developed nations,
thus diminishing the expected profits of pharmaceutical companies and
thwarting the likelihood of pharmaceutical companies' initial
implementation of a tiered-pricing system.267 Companies would need
to be prudent in determining appropriate circumstances to use tiered
pricing.
268
V. PROPOSAL
This comment proposes cooperation among developing nations,
developed nations, and large pharmaceutical companies to create a
solution that effectively balances the use of compulsory licensing to
reduce the cost of needed medication while simultaneously
guaranteeing adequate compensation to the patent owners.
Part A consists of a minimal model of a patent law system to
assist developing nations in taking advantage of compulsory licensing
as allowed under the TRIPS Agreement. In order to guarantee both
price reductions and compensation to patent owners, developed nations
are encouraged to adopt price controls in their own nations for
government-funded patents as stated in Part B. In addition, Part C
recommends an emergency price regulation policy should the price
reductions in Parts A and B prove insufficient.
A. Developing Nations
Developing nations should enact or reform existing patent laws to
provide a more effective system. Combining the following guidelines
presented by James Love 269 with the TRIPS Agreement efficiently
creates a simple patent law system. 270 A patent system should
comprise five essential features: 1) authorize public, non-commercial
use of patents; 2) allow the use of patents during national emergencies
without prior negotiation of the patent owner; 3) establish a royalty
guideline; 4) rely on administrative processes to ease the expense of the
patent system while creating a strong law; and 5) permit production of
patented drugs for exportation in times of public health crises.
B. Developed Nations
Developed nations, like the United States, should more carefully
enforce patent rights resulting from government-funded research
267. See id.
268. See id
269. See supra Part IV.A.
270. See Love, Models, supra note 90.
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according to existing legislation. 7' Such enforcement should assign
essential patent rights to the WHO, thus giving developing nations
permission to manufacture select drugs royalty free. If the developed
country is unwilling to commit to such an assignment of rights, the
developed nation should at a minimum invoke control over the price of
select drugs in their own market for the duration of times of emergency
or public non-commercial use. Such price controls taken by developed
nations will affect international markets, resulting in reduction of prices
in developing countries. Too severe of a price reduction could have
adverse effects, even causing the market to bottom out. If carefully
monitored, however, pharmaceutical price controls could yield a
moderate price reduction while permitting pharmaceutical companies
to recover research costs.
C. Pharmaceutical Companies
Pharmaceutical companies should implement a tiered-pricing
system into the world drug market for use during times of national
emergency.272 An effective system would allow developing countries
to receive drugs at a reduced cost, even as much as a small percentage
of what developed nations pay, but still provide some royalty fee to the
patent owner. Although apparently ineffective alone, a tiered pricing
system enacted within a developing country's own patent system
would further reduce the cost of drugs, even when compulsory
licensing is employed. However, for proper implementation of tiered
pricing, parallel importation must be prohibited and corresponding
amendments to the TRIPS Agreement would be required to ensure
careful implementation of tiered pricing during times of national
emergency.
VI. CONCLUSION
The limited supply and increasing cost of Cipro in the United
States has renewed conflicting concerns over access to life-saving
medication in developing countries and the cost of patented drugs.
273
This controversy focuses on the role of patent protection and the
balance between legally created monopolies, which are necessary as an
incentive for expensive research and development, against access to
medicine at affordable prices.274 Much of this debate rests on the use
271. See supra Part IV.B.
272. See supra Part W.C.
273. See Gellene, supra note 6.
274. See Attaran & Gillespie, supra note 8, at 1886.
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of compulsory licensing as a means of lowering pharmaceutical prices
and increasing drug availability in poorer countries.275
In answer to recent attempts to address the dilemma, this comment
analyzes some of the problems created by compulsory licensing2 76 and
proposed a method to ensure successful use of compulsory licensing in
developing countries.277 Although the task requires deliberate efforts
on the part of developing countries, this comment encourages
cooperation among developing nations, resource-rich developed
countries, and pharmaceutical companies to create a system of effective
use of compulsory licensing while providing patent owners adequate
compensation. The suggested model is a feasible means of balancing
human health and patent-owner rights.
275. See Harrelson, supra note 10, at 175.
276. See supra Part IV.
277. See supra Part V.
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